NEIDL Agent Incident Reporting Summary July 2014 - September 2014, Q3							
Date of Incident	Incident Type / Agent Involved	BSL	Transmissable Person to Person	Description	Reportable Incident	Reportable of Clinical Illness	Comments / Corrective Actions
8/14/14	Inhalation	BSL2	No	Three employees from BU EHS presented at ROHP today to report a chemical exposure on 8/14/14 in the NEIDL. Intermittent exposure to a chemical in the air occurred over a 1/2 hour period during the process of validating a new decontamination procedure. This procedure involved: setting out spores in a lab in the NEIDLclosing the HVAC ventsfumigating the room with formaldehyde to levels of >1200 ppmneutralizing the formaldehyde (in a second fumigation process)turning on the HVAC systementering the room (entry #1), wearing full face respirators and Tyvek suits to take readings of the formaldehyde levels in the air and to retrieve the biological indicators. No formaldehyde was detected in the air at that time. (The HVAC system is on at this time)entering the room (entry #2) to get rid of the salt-like residue on surfaces in the room. (The HVAC system is on at this time)entering the room (entry #3) to shut down the HVAC system, introduce heated water to humidify the air in the room prior to running the decontamination process again, and to put out a new set of biological indicators. No PPE is worn at this time and the HVAC system is off. The employees briefly experienced irritation of the eyes, nose, and skin prior to donning personal protective equipment. The symptoms resolved promptly	No	No	A comprehensive SOP is to be developed covering topics including, but not limited to, equipment calibration, preparation of cleaning solution, adequate PPE, disposal of materials, vacating space during "decon mode" and use of hot plates. Staff have been reminded of instructions for reporting incidents.
9/23/14	l Spill	BSL2	No	During a routine inspection in the NEIDL on 9/23/14, two employees found approximately 1.5 gallons of liquid on the floor of the BSL4 Liquid Waste Decontamination Room, near the effluent liquid tank. The spill is believed to be a water leak from the after-cooler. Although BSL2 work is taking place in the source area (not BSL3 or BLS4 work), the engineering system is functioning as designed. (Waste is treated with a disinfectant in the lab overnight, then sent down the drain into a holding tank, where treatment continues). Policies and procedures were also followed today related to "a spill in the BSL4 area", even though this cannot be BSL4 material. The two employees who found the spill experienced no symptoms. They reported this to ROHP, spoke to an NP, and this was documented, but they were not seen by ROHP. They were not placed on a fever watch or any other surveillance related to this incident. Following discussion, the spill was cleaned up by Facilities, using a water vacuum, rather than having EHS clean up the spill.  Steve Morash, the incident commander, will report this incident to the BPHC. ROHP has documented this incident in the individual medical records, and is reporting the incident to the B.U. Exposure email list.	No	No	Facilities will place spill socks around the area to help contain any water while we wait for parts and make the necessary repairs. Installed by 3 October 2014. 2. Facilities will install a berm around the Condensate Return Unit to contain leaks from the rest of the floor, eliminating any confusion about the source. Installed by 1 December 2014. 3. ERP will distribute the emergency response notification protocols to all Core Directors who will review these protocols with their staffs. Complete by 3 October 2014.