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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2025 (expected)
Main advisor: Andrew F. Newman
Dissertation Committee: Andrew F. Newman, Martin Fiszbein and Robert A. Margo

M.A., Economic Theory (*Coursework*), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Mexico City, Mexico 2017-2018

B.A., Economics (*Highest Honors*), Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Mexico City, Mexico 2017

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Organizational Economics, Economic History, Development Economics

WORKING PAPERS

“Can Protective Tariffs Induce Industrial Consolidations? Theory and Evidence from the Great Merger Movement,” October 2024. Job Market paper.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Rising Concentration and Declining Labor Share: An Organizational IO Perspective” (joint with Andrew F. Newman and Patrick Legros)
“Poverty, Human Capital, and Occupational Structure” (joint Martin Fiszbein, Nicolas Guida-Johnson and Mahesh Karra)

PRIOR PUBLICATIONS

“Luce Rule with Limited Consideration,” (with Levent Ülkü) *Mathematical Social Sciences*, (2018) 93: 52-56.

PRESENTATIONS

Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association (LACEA) and Latin American Econometric Society (LAMES) Annual Meeting, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 2017

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

GRS Graduate Student Fellowship, Boston University, 2018-2024
Academic Merit Scholarship, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), 2017-2018

WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Martin Fiszbein, Department of Economics, Boston University, August 2021 – July 2023

Research Assistant for Laura Alfaro, Harvard Business School, Harvard University, Summer 2022

Research Assistant for Jawwad Noor, Department of Economics, Boston University, September 2019 – December 2020

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, PhD Math Camp, Questrom School of Business, Boston University, Summer 2022, 2023, 2024

Teaching Fellow, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2020-2024

First-year Ph.D: Mathematics for Economists (Fall 2021, 2022, 2023)

M.A.: Mathematics for Economists (Spring 2021, Fall 2023, 2024), Organizational Economics (Spring 2021, 2022), Behavioral Economics (Fall 2020, Spring 2023, 2024)

B.A.: Behavioral Economics (Spring 2023)

Lecturer, B.A. Introductory Microeconomics, Department of Economics, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), Fall 2017, Spring 2018

LANGUAGES

Spanish (native), English (bilingual), French (B2)

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, R, MATLAB, ArcGIS, LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: Mexico and Spain / F1

REFERENCES

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Can Protective Tariffs Induce Industrial Consolidations? Theory and Evidence from the Great Merger Movement (Job Market Paper)

The relationship between protective tariffs and industrial consolidations has been a subject of debate since the late 19th century, a time of protectionism in the United States that saw the rise of trusts across many industries. However, beyond the anecdotal, empirical evidence linking the two remains scarce. Building on a coalitional model of endogenous market structure, I show that higher tariffs can trigger consolidations in industries facing import competition. In such industries, where the price of imports acts as an effective ceiling for domestic producers, higher tariffs can strengthen incentives to merge. To test this prediction, I revisit the Great Merger Movement of the late 19th and early 20th century. I construct a new dataset of consolidations in manufacturing industries, drawing extensively on historical sources to classify them at a detailed product level. My empirical strategy relies on two distinct sources of variation to estimate the effect of tariff changes on consolidations. First, I identify cross-industry variation in exposure to tariff changes using industries' dutiable status and import intensity. Second, I leverage changes in tariff policy driven by party turnover as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in tariff levels. Consistent with my prediction, I find that higher tariffs increase the likelihood of consolidation in tariff-exposed relative to non-tariff-exposed industries.

Rising Concentration and Declining Labor Share: An Organizational IO Perspective (with Andrew F. Newman and Patrick Legros)

A recent literature has drawn attention to rising industry concentration and markups, and declining labor share, across many countries and industries. In line with standard models of market structure, common explanations for these trends rely on some form of growing non-convexities or easing of anti-trust enforcement. Less attention has been given to demand-side forces. In prior work on organizational models of endogenous market structure it has been shown that concentration and markups may increase with the size of product demand. We extend that analysis to incorporate a labor market and find that joint increases in the size of product demand and labor supply result in rising concentration and markups in product markets, a falling labor share, and possibly increased concentration and markdowns in labor markets, even in the absence of any technological change. Decoupling product-market and labor-market size parameters, we provide conditions under which their relative growth induces changes consistent with recent trends.

Poverty, Human Capital, and Occupational Structure (with Martin Fiszbein, Nicolas Guida Johnson and Mahesh Karra)

We study an overlapping-generations model with credit market imperfections and varying degrees of sparsity in occupational structure. Occupations differ in their productivity and human capital requirements. To emphasize that parental investments at early stages of life may constrain human capital formation in later stages, we model human capital formation as dependent on investments received during childhood as well as later monetary investments. We show that, given any finite number of occupations, path dependence and earnings traps may arise even with perfect credit markets. However, the set of parameter values consistent with steady-state multiplicity contracts as we enrich the set of occupations, highlighting the role of occupational structure in shaping long-run equilibria.