

MENGQI DENG

Boston University
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EDUCATION

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, May 2022 (expected)
Dissertation Committee: Juan Ortner (Main Advisor), Andrew F. Newman and Alex White
Dissertation Title: *Three Essays in Political Economy*

M.A., Economic Policy, Boston University, Boston MA, 2014

B.A., Economics and Psychology (*Cum Laude*), Macalester College,
Saint Paul, MN, 2013

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Applied Microeconomic Theory, Law and Economics, Political Economy

WORKING PAPERS

[“Selective Revelation: Information Markets with Biased Media”](#) (Job Market Paper)

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Is Asymmetric Punishment Useful? The Case of Petty Corruption”
“Identity and Priming in a Differentiated Candidate Framework”

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dean's Fellowship, Boston University, 2015-2020
Summer Stipend, Department of Economics, Boston University, 2017-2020
Dean's List Distinction, Boston University, 2013-2014
Dean's List Distinction, Macalester College, 2009-2013

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Teaching Fellow, Development Strategy (master of arts), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2017 -Spring 2020
Teaching Fellow, Empirical Economics (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Spring 2020
Teaching Fellow, Economics of Corporate Organizations (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University Spring 2019
Teaching Fellow, Economic Development (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017-Fall 2019
Teaching Fellow, Labor Economics (undergraduate), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017-Fall 2018
Teaching Fellow, Development Policy (master of arts), Department of Economics, Boston University, Fall 2017

LANGUAGES

Fluent in English, native Chinese speaker.

COMPUTER SKILLS: STATA, MATLAB, LaTeX, Mathematica, Python

CITIZENSHIP/VISA STATUS: China/F1

REFERENCES**Professor Juan
Ortner**

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“Selective Revelation: Information Markets with Biased Media” (Job Market Paper)

The model describes an environment where media outlets have their own agendas while revealing the true state to a continuum of audience who then proceed to vote on a policy that impacts the audience differently depending on the realized state of nature. This work draws heavily from the Bayesian persuasion literature, in that biased information providers can commit to an information structure a la Kamenica & Gentzkow (2011), and receivers who are rational willingly change their behavior in favor of the sender’s preferred outcome. The main departure from previous work in the Bayesian persuasion literature is that this paper deals with an environment with multiple senders along with multiple receivers and tackles a broader set of questions including social welfare and market outcomes.

“Is Asymmetric Punishment Useful? The Case of Petty Corruption”

This paper deals with the debated usefulness of dishing out asymmetric punishment to both parties in corruption cases, especially when the bribed officials are known to extort ordinary citizens. The study finds that asymmetric punishment to battle corruption must be administered with care, as application to unsuitable situations will increase official’s incentives to engage in bribery. As a follow-up to this static study, dynamic models are studied, as well as extensions to interactions between one official and multiple citizens. Results are largely in line with the static model.

“Identity and Priming in a Differentiated Candidate Framework”

“Identity and Priming in a Differentiated Candidate Framework” draws on the works of Polborn & Krasa (2010, 2012, 2014) and delineates the cases where policy divergence occurs in equilibrium, in contrast to results of the median voter theorem. Ongoing work attempt to expand the model to admit “endogenous types”, where voters are permitted to choose their own groups before voting, in the spirit of Shayo (2009) and Grossman & Helpman (2018).